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Abstract   
Privacy has become a serious concern for modern Information Societies. The sensitive nature of much of the data 
that are daily exchanged or released to untrusted parties requires that responsible organizations undertake 
appropriate privacy protection measures. Nowadays, much of these data are texts (e.g., emails, messages posted in 
social media, healthcare outcomes, etc.) that, because of their unstructured and semantic nature, constitute a 
challenge for automatic data protection methods. In fact, textual documents are usually protected manually, in a 
process known as document redaction or sanitization. To do so, human experts identify sensitive terms (i.e., terms 
that may reveal identities and/or confidential information) and protect them accordingly (e.g., via removal or, 
preferably, generalization). To relieve experts from this burdensome task, in a previous work we introduced the 
theoretical basis of C-sanitization, an inherently semantic privacy model that provides the basis to the development 
of automatic document redaction/sanitization algorithms and offers clear and a priori privacy guarantees on data 
protection; even though its potential benefits C-sanitization still presents some limitations when applied to practice 
(mainly regarding flexibility, efficiency and accuracy). In this paper, we propose a new more flexible model, named 
(C, g(C))-sanitization, which enables an intuitive configuration of the trade-off between the desired level of 
protection (i.e., controlled information disclosure) and the preservation of the utility of the protected data (i.e., 
amount of semantics to be preserved). Moreover, we also present a set of technical solutions and algorithms that 
provide an efficient and scalable implementation of the model and improve its practical accuracy, as we also 
illustrate through empirical experiments. 
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1. Introduction 
Information Technologies have paved the way for global scale data sharing. Nowadays, companies, 
governments and subjects exchange and release large amounts of electronic data on daily basis. However, 
in many occasions, these data refer to personal features of individuals (e.g., identities, preferences, 
opinions, salaries, diagnoses, etc.), thus causing a serious privacy threat. To prevent this threat, 
appropriate data protection measures should be undertaken by responsible parties in order to fulfill with 
current legislations on data privacy [1, 2].  
 
Because of the enormous amount of data to be managed and the burden and cost of manual data 
protection [3], many automated methods have been proposed in recent years under the umbrella of 
Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC) [4]. These methods aim at masking input data in a way that either 
identity or confidential attribute disclosure are minimized. The former deals with the protection of 
information that can re-identify an individual (e.g., a social security number or unique combinations of 
several attributes, such as the age, job and address), and it is usually referred to as anonymization, 
whereas the latter deals with the protection of confidential data (e.g., salaries or diagnosis). To do so, 
protection methods remove, distort or coarse input data while balancing the trade-off between privacy and 
data utility: the more exhaustive the data protection is, the higher the privacy but the less useful the 
protected data becomes as a result of the applied distortion, and vice-versa. In addition to data protection 
methods, the computer science community has proposed formal privacy models [5], within the area of 
Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing (PPDP) [6] and Data Mining (PPDM) [7, 8]. In comparison to the 
ad-hoc masking of SDC methods, in which the level of protection is empirically evaluated a posteriori for 
a specific dataset [5], privacy models attain a predefined notion of privacy and offer a priori privacy 
guarantees over the protected data (e.g., a probability of re-identification [9, 10]). This provides a clearer 
picture on the level of protection that is applied to the data, regardless the features or distribution of a 
specific dataset. Moreover, privacy models provide a de facto standard to develop privacy-preserving 
tools, which can be objectively compared by fixing the desired privacy level in advance.  
 
So far, most privacy models and protection mechanisms have focused on structured statistical databases 
[11], which present a regular structure (i.e., records refer to individuals that are described by a set of 
usually uni-valued attributes) and mostly contain numerical data. Privacy models such the well-known k-
anonymity notion relied on such regularities to define privacy guarantees: a data base is said to be k-
anonymous if any record is indistinguishable with regard to the attributes that may identify an individual 
from, at least, k-1 other records [9, 10].   
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However, many of the (sensitive) data that is exchanged in current data sharing scenarios is textual and 
unstructured (e.g., messages posted in social media, e-mails, medical reports, etc.). In comparison with 
structured databases, plain textual data protection entails additional challenges: 
- Due to their lack of structure, we cannot pre-classify input data according to identifying and/or 
confidential attributes, as most data protection mechanisms do [11]; in fact, for plain text, any 
combination of textual terms of any cardinality may produce disclosure.  
- In comparison with the usually numerical attributes found in structured databases, plain textual 
data cannot be compared and transformed by means of standard arithmetical operators. In fact, 
since textual documents are interpreted by data producers and consumers (and also potential 
attackers) according to the meaning of their contents, linguistic tools and semantic analyses are 
needed to properly protect them [12]. 
 
Because of the above challenges, the protection of plain textual documents has not received enough 
attention in the current literature [13-15]. As we discuss in the next section, most of the current methods 
and privacy models for textual data protection are naïve, unintuitive, require from a significant 
intervention of human experts and/or limit the protection to predefined types of textual entities.  
1.1.   Background on plain textual data protection 
Traditionally, plain textual data protection has been performed manually, in a process by which several 
experts detect and mask terms that may disclose identities and/or confidential information, either directly 
(e.g., names, SS numbers, sensitive diseases, etc.) or by means of semantic inferences (e.g., treatments or 
drugs that may reveal sensitive diseases, readings that may suggest political preferences or habits that can 
be related to religion or sexual orientations) [16]. In this context, data semantics are crucial because they 
define the way by which humans (sanitizers, data analysts and also potential attackers) understand and 
manage textual data.  
 
In general, plain textual data protection consists of two main tasks: i) identify textual terms that may 
disclose sensitive information according to a privacy criterion (e.g., names, addresses, authorship, 
personal features, etc.); and ii) mask these terms to minimize disclosure by means of an appropriate 
protection mechanism (e.g., removal, generalization, etc.). The community refers to the act of removing 
or blacking-out sensitive terms as redaction, whereas sanitization usually consists in coarsening them via 
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generalization (e.g., AIDS can be replaced by a less detailed generalization such as disease) [3]. The latter 
approach, which we use in this paper, better preserves the utility of the output.  
 
To relieve human experts from the burden of manual sanitization, the research community has proposed 
mechanisms to tackle specific data protection needs. On the one hand, we can find works that aim at 
inferring sensitive information, such as the authorship of a resource (e.g., documents, emails, source code, 
etc.) [17] or the profile of the author (e.g., gender) [18]; on the other hand, other works aim at preventing 
disclosure by masking the data that may disclose that authorship [19, 20]. In the healthcare context, we 
can find ad-hoc data protection approaches that focus on detecting protected health information (PHI, 
such as ages, e-mails, locations, dates or social security numbers) [21], which are data that, according to 
the HIPAA “Safe Harbor” rules, must be eliminated before releasing electronic healthcare records to third 
parties. Most of these application-specific approaches exploit the regularities of the lexico-syntactic 
regularities of the entities to be detected (e.g., use of capitalizations for proper names, structure of dates or 
e-mails, etc.) to define patterns or employ machine learning techniques such as trained classifiers. 
However, the applicability of these methods is limited to the use case they consider, and they do not offer 
robust guarantees against disclosure outside the entities in which they focus.   
 
General-purpose privacy solutions for plain text are scarce and they only focus on the protection of 
sensitive terms, which are assumed to be manually identified beforehand. We can find two privacy 
models that reformulate the notion of k-anonymity for documents rather than data bases: K-safety [22] 
and K-confusability [23]. Both approaches assume the availability of a large and homogenous collection 
of documents, and require each sensitive entity mentioned in each document of the collection to be 
indistinguishable from, at least, K-1 other entities in the collection. To do so, terms are generalized (so 
that they become less diverse and, hence, indistinguishable) in groups of K documents. However, 
documents cannot be sanitized individually and, due to the need to generalize terms to a common 
abstraction, data semantics will be hampered if the contents of the collection are not perfectly 
homogenous.  
 
In [15], a privacy model named t-plausibility that also relies on the generalization of manually identified 
sensitive terms was presented. A document is said to fulfill t-plausibility if, at least, t different plausible 
documents can be derived from the protected document by specializing sanitized entities; that is, the 
protected document generalizes, at least, t documents obtained by combining specializations of the 
sanitized terms. Even though this approach allows sanitizing documents individually, it is noted that 
setting the t-plausibility level is not intuitive and that one can hardly predict the results of a given t, 
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because they would depend on the document size, the number of sensitive entities and the number of 
available generalizations and specializations.  
 
To tackle the limitations of the above-described solutions, in [13] we presented an inherently semantic 
privacy model for textual data: C-sanitization. Its goal is to mimic and, hence, automatize the analysis of 
semantic inferences that human experts perform for document sanitization. Informally, the disclosure risk 
caused by semantic inferences is assessed by answering to this question: does a term or a combination of 
terms in a document to be released allow to univocally inferring and, thus, disclosing a sensitive entity 
defined in C? According to such vision, the privacy guarantees offered by the model state that a C-
sanitized document should not contain any term that, individually or in aggregate, univocally reveals the 
semantics of the sensitive entities stated in C. In accordance with current privacy legislations, C may 
contain the entities that legal frameworks define as sensitive, such as religious and political topics or 
certain diseases [24]. For example, an AIDS-sanitized medical record should not contain terms that enable 
a univocal inference of AIDS, such as HIV or closely related symptoms or treatments.  
 
In [13], C-sanitization is formalized according to the following elements: (1) D: the document to be 
protected. (2) C: the set of sensitive entities that should be protected from univocal disclosure in D (e.g., 
C could be a set of sensitive diseases or religious or political topics and D a medical record or a message 
to be posted in a social network). (3) T: whatever group of terms of any cardinality occurring in D that 
could be used by an attacker to unambiguously infer any of the sensitive entities in C (e.g., if C is a 
sensitive disease, T could be a synonym or a lexicalization, or a combination of treatments, drugs or 
symptoms that univocally refers to C). (4) K: the knowledge that potential attackers can exploit to 
perform the semantic inferences. The larger and the more complete the knowledge K is assumed to be, the 
stricter and the more realistic the assessment of disclosure risks will be and, hence, the more robust the 
privacy protection will be. C-sanitization relies on the evaluation of the disclosure risk that terms in D 
cause with regard to C according to the background knowledge K. Moreover, the privacy guarantees 
offered by C-sanitization ensure that univocal semantic inferences/disclosure of any of the entities in C 
are prevented. Formally, it is defined as follows. 
  
Definition 1. (C-sanitization). Given an input document D, the background knowledge K and a set of 
sensitive entities C to be protected, D’ is the C-sanitized version of D if D’ does not contain any term t or 
group of terms T that, individually or in aggregate, univocally disclose any entity in C by exploiting K. 
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The enforcement of C-sanitization relies on the foundations of the Information Theory to assess and 
quantify the semantics to be protected (defined by C) and those disclosed by the terms appearing in the 
document to be protected, much like humans experts do [3]. The implementation of the C-sanitization can 
provide the following advantages over the above-described works: i) automatic detection of terms that 
may cause disclosure of sensitive data via semantic inferences, a task that has been identified as one of 
the most difficult and time-consuming for human experts [3, 16], ii) utility-preserving sanitization based 
on accurate term generalization, iii) intuitive definition of the a priori privacy guarantees by means of 
linguistic labels (i.e., the set C of entities to be protected), instead of the abstract numbers used in all the 
former privacy models, and iv) individual and independent protection of documents (rather than 
homogenous document collections), regardless their content or structure.  
1.2.   Contributions and plan of this paper 
In spite of its potential benefits, C-sanitization still presents some limitations when applied to practical 
settings. In this paper, we tackle three main aspects. First, with C-sanitization the degree of protection is 
fixed: all the entities in C are protected in the same way according to a fixed criterion of strict non-
univocal disclosure. This may be too rigid and even insufficient in scenarios in which a stricter protection 
is needed: not only the entities in C should not be univocally disclosed, but also the ambiguity of the 
inferences should be large, so that we avoid plausible (even though non-univocal) disclosure. To solve 
this issue, we propose a new privacy model (which we name (C, g(C))-sanitization) that offers additional 
guarantees of disclosure limitation on top of those offered by the plain C-sanitization. The additional 
parameter of the (C, g(C))-sanitization enables to seamlessly configure the trade-off between the 
additional protection and the preservation of semantics, in a similar way that the k or t parameters do for 
k-anonymity or t-plausibility, respectively; but, we use intuitive linguistic labels (rather than abstract 
numbers) that give the user a clearer idea of the expected degree of protection and of semantic 
preservation. In this regard, our goal is to improve the flexibility and adaptability of the model 
instantiation to heterogeneous scenarios and privacy/utility preservation needs without impairing the 
intuitiveness of its instantiation and of the privacy guarantees it offers. 
 
Second, like any other model that tries to balance the trade-off between privacy protection and data utility 
preservation, the enforcement of (C, g(C))-sanitization is NP-hard in its optimal form [13]. To render the 
implementation practical and scalable, in this paper we also propose several heuristics that carefully 
consider data semantics to guide the sanitization process. Moreover, we also propose a flexible greedy 
algorithm incorporating these heuristics and providing a practical and scalable implementation of the 
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proposed model. The algorithm also provides parameters to configure its behavior towards maximizing its 
scalability or the protection accuracy. 
 
Third, as it will be discussed in the fourth section, the enforcement of both C-sanitization and (C, g(C))-
sanitization relies on an accurate assessment of the informativeness of terms, which is used to quantify 
the semantics they disclose. Being able to perform such assessment in a generic way is not trivial [25, 26], 
and natural language-related problems (i.e., language ambiguity) may severely hamper its accuracy. To 
tackle this issue we also propose an accurate, scalable and generic mechanism to measure the 
informativeness of terms by using the Web as general-purpose corpora.  
 
Finally, we illustrate the applicability and flexibility of (C, g(C))-sanitization (in comparison with the 
former C-sanitization, which we use as evaluation baseline) by means of an empirical study. In this study, 
we also test the improvements related to protection accuracy and efficiency brought by the technical 
solutions we propose here with respect to the former work [13]. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section presents the new (C, g(C))-sanitization, 
which provides improved flexibility and configurability. The third section discusses the issues related to 
the practical enforcement of the model, proposes several heuristics to guide the protection process and 
presents a customizable and scalable algorithm. The fourth section discusses the issues related to the 
computation of term informativeness and proposes a generic solution that exploits the Web for that 
purpose. The fifth section reports and discusses the results of an empirical analysis of the model’s 
implementation against the baseline work in [13]. The final section depicts the conclusions and presents 
some lines of future research. 
2.   A flexible privacy model for textual documents 
In this section, we present a flexible privacy model for textual documents that allows configuring the 
trade-off between privacy protection (on top of the disclosure limitation guarantees of plain C-
sanitization) and data utility preservation. As mentioned above, a C-sanitized document D’ will offer the 
guarantee of a non-univocal disclosure (i.e., no unambiguous inference) of any entity in C. However, this 
guarantee could be too rigid in some scenarios. In practice, it is quite common to consider unacceptable 
the disclosure of a significant amount of the sensitive semantics because attackers may correctly infer the 
sensitive entities with a low ambiguity/high probability (even though not univocally). In these cases, we 
require of a mechanism to configure the trade-off between the additional degree of protection to be 
 8 
 
applied (i.e., a level of uncertainty in the semantic inferences larger than the strict non-univocal 
disclosure) and the preservation of data semantics allowed by such degree of protection.  
 
The model we propose, named (C, g(C))-sanitization, allows configuring this trade-off on top of the 
privacy guarantees stated by C-sanitization, and without hampering the intuitiveness of the model 
instantiation. To do so, we define a (linguistic) parameter g(C) that allows to straightforwardly specify the 
maximum amount of allowed information/semantics disclosure of each entity c in C. To do so, we rely on 
the fact that the generalizations of an entity c disclose a strict subset of the semantics of c. According to 
this, we can lower the maximum level of semantic disclosure allowed for c (and, thus, force a stricter 
protection), by using an appropriate generalization g(c) as the threshold for risk assessment (instead of 
just c). Moreover, by defining a specific generalization for each c, we can independently and finely tune 
the allowed level of disclosure for each sensitive entity. This improves the flexibility of the model 
instantiation, which can be adapted to heterogeneous entities and privacy needs, as follows.  
 
Definition 2. ((C, g(C))-sanitization) Given an input document D, the background knowledge K, an 
ordered set of sensitive entities C to be protected and an ordered set of their generalizations g(C), we say 
that D’ is the (C, g(C))-sanitized version of D if D’ does not contain any term t or group of terms T that, 
individually or in aggregate, can disclose more semantics of any entity c in C, than those provided by 
their respective generalization g(c) in g(C) by exploiting K. 
 
For example, if we apply an (AIDS, chronic disorder)-sanitization over a document, we are stating that 
the protected version will reveal an amount of semantics of AIDS that, at most, corresponds to those of its 
generalization, chronic disorder; that is, any conclusions resulting from a semantic inference more 
specific than that will be uncertain. On the contrary, an AIDS-sanitized document (i.e., according to 
Definition 1), even though would not univocally reveal the concrete disease, AIDS, may disclose more 
specific semantics that could enable to infer that the document is referring about a disorder of the immune 
system, a conclusion that may be risky in some scenarios. In general, the more abstract the generalizations 
g(C) used as thresholds are (e.g, g(AIDS)=condition), the more the ambiguity we add in the attacker’s 
inferences and the less specific or certain his conclusions will be. Indeed, this lowers the actual disclosure 
risk at the cost of data semantics preservation, because a larger number of plausible solutions exists (e.g., 
in an (AIDS, condition)-sanitized document, conditions other than AIDS are as plausible as AIDS). Notice 
that, according to Definition 2, if several entities should be protected for a certain document, an ordered 
set of sensitive entities and their corresponding generalizations should be provided, such as ({AIDS, 
HIV}, {Condition, Virus}). 
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The disclosure assessment of C-sanitization is based on an information theoretical characterization of the 
semantics of terms. The underlying idea is that the semantics encompassed by a term can be quantified by 
the amount of information it provides, that is, its Information Content (IC), as it is widely accepted by the 
semantic community [25, 27]. By applying the notion of IC to each sensitive entity c in C, it turns that 
IC(c) is measuring the amount of sensitive information (of c) that should be protected because the 
disclosure of this information in the output document is what univocally reveals the semantics of c. Under 
the same premise, the amount of semantics of c revealed by individual terms t or groups of terms T 
appearing in the document D can be measured according to their overlap of information, that is, their 
Point-wise Mutual Information (PMI).  
 
On the one hand, the IC of a textual term t can be computed as the inverse of its probability of occurrence 
in corpora (which, in our case, represents the knowledge K available to potential attackers). 
 
( ) log ( )IC t p t= −
          (1) 
 
On the other hand, the PMI between a term t and a sensitive entity c can be computed as the difference 
between the normalized probability of co-occurrence of the two entities, given their joint and marginal 
distributions in corpora [28]: 
 
( ) log
( ) ( )
( , );PMI c
p c p t
p c tt =          (2) 
 
Fig. 1 (left) shows how PMI measures the amount of information overlap between two entities.  
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Fig. 1. Greyed area: on the left, amount of information/semantics that t discloses from c (and vice-versa); 
on the right: amount of semantics/information of c disclosed by the co-occurrence of t1 and t2. 
 
Likewise, the semantic disclosure of c caused by the aggregation of a group of co-occurring terms 
T={t1,…,tn} can be computed as follows:  
( ) log
( ) ( )
( , ,..., );
,...,
1 n
1 n
PMI c
p c p
p c t tT
t t
=         (3) 
 
As shown in Fig. 1 (right), in this case, PMI is measuring the disclosure of c as the union of the individual 
disclosures caused by each element ti in the group T={t1, t2}.  
 
Numerically, PMI is maximum if, in the underlying corpora that represents the knowledge K, a single t or 
a combination T always co-occurs with c, thus resulting in PMI(c;t)=IC(c) and PMI(c;T)=IC(c), 
respectively. This states that c is completely disclosed by t or T because the semantics of the former can 
be univocally inferred from the latter (i.e., there is no ambiguity in the semantic inference).  
 
Thus, to satisfy Definition 1, those individual terms t or groups of terms T in D whose PMI with regard to 
each c in C is equal to the IC(c), should be sanitized or redacted (i.e., generalized or removed) from the 
output document D’.  
 
By relying on the information theoretic characterization of data semantics depicted above, we propose 
enforcing (C, g(C))-sanitization (Definition 2) as follows. First, instead of using IC(c) as the threshold 
stating the maximum allowed disclosure during the assessment of risks, we use IC(g(c)); in this way, the 
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maximum amount of information/semantics of c that is allowed to be disclosed in the protected document 
are lowered until those of g(c), which is strictly less informative than c. This is formalized in Definition 3. 
 
Definition 3. (Information Theoretic (C, g(C))-sanitization). Given an input document D, the corpora that 
represents the knowledge K, an ordered set of sensitive entities C to be protected and an ordered set of 
their generalizations g(C), we say that D’ is the (C, g(C))-sanitized version of D if, for all c in C, D’ does 
not contain any term t or group of terms T so that, according to corpora, PMI(c;t)>IC(g(c)) or 
PMI(c;T)>IC(g(c)), respectively. 
 
Graphically, as shown in Fig. 2 (right), the use of a generalization g(c) as disclosure threshold for c 
(boldface circled area) lowers the amount of information/semantics that terms t or groups of terms T can 
disclose about c (greyed area). Compared to the basic C-sanitization (Fig. 2 (left), in which IC(c) acts as 
the threshold and for which t is not risky), (C,g(C))-sanitization forces the system to implement a stricter 
sanitization (see Fig.2 (right), in which IC(g(c)) is the threshold and for which t is risky); this will provide 
a better protection at the cost of the preservation of data semantics.  
 
Figure 2. Left: C-sanitization; Right: (C,g(C))-sanitization. Boldface circled areas represent the 
thresholds used by each model for assessing disclosure risks. 
 
The g(c) parameter in the proposed model allows configuring the inherent trade-off between privacy 
protection and data utility preservation, similarly to what the numerical parameters of other models (e.g., 
k-anonymity, t-plausibility) do. For example, the larger the k we specify when instantiating the k-
anonymity model, the more homogenous (i.e., indistinguishable) the protected data become and, thus, the 
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better the protection is but the lower the utility will be. In (C,g(C))-sanitization, the more abstract the 
generalizations g(C) are, the less informative but the more protected D’ becomes. Even though the 
possibility of balancing this trade-off is common to most privacy models available in the literature [11], 
all of them rely on abstract numerical parameters (k-anonymity, l-diversity, t-closeness, ε-differential 
privacy, t-plausibility, K-confusability, K-safety) whose practical influence in the protected output is, in 
most cases, difficult to understand and even more difficult to predict [13, 15]. On the contrary, the use of 
generalizations as thresholds of disclosure in our model is very intuitive because it provides a clear 
understanding on the amount of semantics that external entities (whether they are readers, data analysts or 
attackers) can learn of each c in the protected document. Moreover, as discussed above and contrary to 
numerically-oriented privacy models, these linguistic parameters enable a seamless adaptation of the 
model instantiation to current legislations on data privacy, whose rules about the topics that should be 
protected and up to which degree are also expressed linguistically; for example, locations more specific 
than counties should be protected according to the HIPAA [1], information that could reveal the specific 
race or religion of an individual is sensitive according to the EU Data Protection Regulation, etc. This 
greatly facilitates the model instantiation and, as far as we know, provides the first privacy model by 
which practitioners can directly enforce the guidelines stated in current legal frameworks. 
3.   Towards scalable and utility-preserving sanitization of risky terms 
In order to be utility preserving, document sanitization should protect risky terms by replacing them by 
generalizations, rather than just removing or blacking them out. Generalizing risky terms t (e.g., AIDS) by 
privacy-preserving generalizations g(t) (e.g., disease), which are less specific (i.e., 
IC(disease)<IC(AIDS)), will decrease the level of disclosure of c while still retaining a subset of the 
semantics of t (i.e., we still know that t is a disease). Thus, in our approach, once a term t is found to be 
risky according to the model instantiation, it is replaced with an appropriate generalization g(t) retrieved 
from a Knowledge Base (KB) that fulfills the privacy guarantee as defined in Definition 3; considering 
that the sanitized document D’ must not contain any term t so that PMI(c;g(t)) >IC(g(c)), we replace 
terms by generalization so that PMI(c;g(t)) ≤ IC(g(c)), where PMI(c;g(t)) represents the information 
retained of t (and disclosed of c) when t is replaced by a generalization g(t).  
 
Fig.3 illustrates this process: a term t, which discloses more information about c (whole greyed area) than 
that allowed by the threshold g(c) (boldface circle) is replaced by g(t) (dashed circle), which lowers the 
disclosed information low enough below the threshold but still retains some semantics (dark greyed area).   
 
 13 
 
 
Fig. 3. (C,g(C))-sanitization of t via utility-preserving generalization: t is replaced by g(t). 
 
From the perspective of the preservation of data utility, the optimal generalization g(t) replacing a term t 
should retain the maximum semantics of t as possible, while fulfilling the guarantees of the model 
instantiation; in other words, g(t) should be the generalization, from those available in the KB, with the 
highest IC(g(t)) that fulfills PMI(c;g(t)) ≤ IC(g(c)). As introduced above, like any other model that tries to 
balance the trade-off between privacy protection and data utility (e.g., k-anonymity, t-plausibility) 
selecting these generalizations in an optimal way (with respect to data utility preservation) is NP-hard; 
thus, it could compromise the applicability of the model. In this section, we discuss this issue and propose 
several technical solutions to make the model implementation scalable. 
 
On the one hand, it is important to note that the selected generalization g(t) (from those available in the 
KB) of a certain t should fulfill the privacy criterion for all of the sensitive entities cj in C. Formally: 
 
( ) |( ( ; ( )) ( ( )), )
( ) arg max ( ( ( )))
i j i j j
i
g t KB PMI c g t IC g c c C
g t IC g t
∀ ∈ ≤ ∀ ∈
=       (4) 
 
On the other hand, in the most general case of groups of terms T of any cardinality, the optimal 
sanitization (i.e., the combination of generalizations of each ti in T that, in aggregate, retains the 
maximum amount of semantics while fulfilling the privacy criterion) is certainly NP-hard because the 
order in which terms in D are evaluated influences the order in which the groups of terms T are analyzed 
and sanitized, if needed. Hence, an optimal utility-preserving sanitization requires evaluating all possible 
combinations of T in D of any cardinality and any possible generalization of each ti in T, and picking up 
the combination of T that fulfills the privacy criterion while optimizing the preservation of semantics. 
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To render the sanitization process practical, we propose the following efficient greedy algorithm that 
relies on several utility-preserving heuristics to provide a scalable implementation of the model. 
 
Algorithm 1.  
Input:  D  //the input document  
        KBs  //the knowledge bases used to retrieve generalizations 
  C //the ordered set of entities to be protected 
  g_C //the ordered set of generalizations of the entities to be protected 
  MAX //maximum cardinality of the combinations of terms (A2) 
Output: D’   //the sanitized document 
  
1  D’=D; 
2  for each (di ⊆ D) do //for each context di defined in the document D (A1) 
3  n=1; //cardinality of the combination of terms to evaluate (H1)     
4  Term_seti=getSortedTerms(di); //terms in the context di sorted by their IC (H2) 
5    while (n≤|Term_seti| and n<MAX) do //create combinations up to MAX cardinality(A2) 
6      Combin=getComb(Term_seti, n); //ordered set of combinations with cardinality n  
7      while (not(empty(Combin))) do //evaluate each combination 
8        Tj=first(Combin); 
9        remove(Tj, Combin);   
10       risky =false; 
11       ck=first(C); //obtain the first sensitive entity to evaluate  
12       g_ck=first(g_C); //get the corresponding generalization 
13       while (not(risky) and ck ≠ null) do //evaluate all sensitive entities 
14         if (PMI(ck;Tj)>IC(g_ck)) then //privacy criterion according to Def.4 
15           risky =true; 
16         else 
17           ck=next(C); //get the next sensitive entity  
18           g_ck=next(g_C); //get the corresponding generalization 
19         end if 
20       end while 
21       if (risky) then //if the combination was risky 
22         Gen_setj=getSortedGen(Tj, KBs); //ordered sets of generalizations of Tj (H3)   
23         g_Tj=first(Gen_setj);    
           //check if the generalization set g_Tj fulfills Def. 4 for all ck in C 
24         while (not(PMI(ck;g_Tj)<(IC(g_ck)) ∀ ck ϵ C)) do  
25           g_Tj=next(Gen_setj); 
26         end while 
27         sanitize(Tj, g_Tj, D’); //replace terms in Tj by generalizations in g_Tj 
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28         replaceGenTerms(Tj, g_Tj, Term_seti); //also in the set of terms to evaluate 
29       end if   
30     end while   
31     n++; //evaluate longer combinations of terms 
32   end while 
33 end for   
34 return D’; 
 
Three heuristics are proposed to guide the protection process towards maximizing the preservation of data 
semantics: 
- H1: evaluate first the groups of terms T with lowest cardinality |T|. The idea is to avoid starting 
the analysis with large sets of terms because, in case of disclosure of any c in C, we cannot 
discern which of the terms ti in T are indeed causing that disclosure (because of their strong 
relationship with c) from those that are irrelevant (and that could be even removed from T without 
significantly altering the disclosure assessment). Thus, to avoid unnecessary sanitizations of non-
related or slightly related terms when combined with highly related ones, we start the analysis 
with individual terms (i.e., |T|=1, line 3 in Algorithm 1). In case of disclosure, these individual 
terms will be sanitized and, from that moment, they will be replaced by the appropriate 
generalizations in further iterations of the analysis (line 28 in Algorithm 1). Only once all 
individual terms have been evaluated for disclosure (and eventually replaced by generalizations), 
the process continues with groups of two terms, and so on (line 32 in Algorithm 1).   
- H2: at each iteration of the analysis, evaluate first those terms with the highest informativeness 
(line 4 in Algorithm 1). Terms t with high IC(t) reveal more information; thus, if t is semantically 
related with the entities C to be protected (most textual terms are in fact related up to some degree 
[14]), those terms with a higher informativeness are more likely to disclose a larger amount of the 
C’s semantics. In this manner, the most potentially risky terms and the combinations in which 
they are involved are evaluated (and sanitized) first (line 6 in Algorithm 1). With this, we 
contribute to minimize the amount of unnecessary sanitizations, because we avoid combining 
highly informative (and thus potentially risky) terms with those with low informativeness, which 
may not need to be protected. 
- H3: once a combination of terms T is found to be risky according to the privacy criterion, the 
sanitization process is performed by: i) picking all the possible generalizations g(ti) for all the 
terms ti in T, ii) generating all the possible combinations of generalizations, iii) sorting these 
combinations according to the aggregated informativeness of their elements (line 22 in Algorithm 
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1) and, according to such order, iv) selecting the first one that fulfills the privacy criterion (line 24 
in Algorithm 1).   
 
We can see that the combination of these heuristics in the greedy algorithm guides the protection towards 
minimizing the number of unnecessary sanitizations. Moreover, in order to make the practical 
enforcement more scalable (especially for large documents) two additional parameters have been also 
incorporated into the algorithm:  
- A1: allows splitting the input document D in several textual contexts di ⊆ D (line 2 in Algorithm 
1) so that the analysis of groups of terms is limited to the words framed in a subset of the 
document and, thus, a smaller amount of term combinations shall be considered. This relies on 
the assumption that, in general, the strength of the semantic relationships between terms co-
occurring in a document tends to decrease as they are more distant in the text [29], as it does the 
disclosure risk. This approach is usually considered by other sanitization mechanisms available in 
the literature, which define textual contexts as paragraphs, sentences or just adjacent words [15]. 
- A2: limits the maximum cardinality of the groups of terms. As above, with this action we achieve 
analyzing a smaller number of combinations (line 5 in Algorithm 1). In the most extreme case, 
only individual terms may be considered, thus solving the problem in linear time with respect to 
the number of terms in the document. However, this action may hamper the accuracy of the 
disclosure assessment because larger combinations of terms will be omitted. To compensate this 
issue, more abstract generalizations g(C) may be defined as sanitization thresholds, so that a 
stricter (but more scalable) sanitization is applied in practice.  
4.   Corpora selection and probability calculation 
The information theoretic enforcement of (C, g(C))-sanitization extensively relies on the probabilities of 
(co-)occurrence of terms (eqs. (1)(2)(3)) to measure term semantics. The accuracy of the probability 
calculation is thus crucial to ensure the consistency of the model enforcement; however, this is also a 
challenging task, because language ambiguity may hamper this calculation [26, 30]. On the other hand, 
the selection of the corpus from which to compute probabilities is also important to make K (i.e., the 
knowledge we assume is available for attackers) a faithful representation of the semantics as they are 
understood and used by humans (i.e., sanitizers, data analyst and potential attackers). In this section, we 
discuss these two important issues and propose a general approach to accurately compute probabilities. 
 
 17 
 
The first author proposing the use of IC to quantify the semantics of concepts was Resnik [25], in a work 
that seminally inspired many other semantic researchers [31-35]. Probabilities were computed from 
tagged textual corpora, in which term appearances were manually associated to their conceptualizations 
(i.e., meanings) that were modeled in a reference knowledge base; for example, the occurrence of the 
word “virus” referring to a malicious computer program was associated to the concept “(computer) 
virus”, whereas the occurrence of the word “virus” referring to an infectious microorganism was 
associated to the concept “(biological) virus”. In this manner concept occurrences were properly 
disambiguated and, thus, their probabilities were not affected by the potential ambiguity (i.e., synonymy 
or polysemy) inherent to the terms (and their lexicalizations) used to refer to the concepts. Moreover, the 
probability calculation was made consistent with the taxonomic structure of the conceptualizations used 
to perform the annotation (e.g., (biological) virus → microorganism → organism): the probability of a 
concept c (e.g., microorganism) considers all the explicit appearances of the lexicalizations of c (i.e., 
synonyms or acronyms, such as micro-organism) and also all of their specializations (i.e., hyponyms, 
such as virus, bacteria, pathogen, etc.). Formally: 
 
( )
( )
( ) h
h
c hyponyms c
occurrences c
p c
N
∈
∑
=  ,       (5) 
where hyponyms(c) includes the concept c and all of its specializations, and N is the total number of 
occurrences of concepts in the corpus.  
 
With this approach, it is ensured that the probability of concepts monotonically increase as one moves up 
in the taxonomy of concepts (e.g., p((biological) virus) ≤ p(microorganism) ≤ p(organism)) which, in 
turn, ensures that the IC of a concept is lower than that of its hyponyms (e.g., IC((biological) virus) ≥ 
IC(microorganism) ≥ IC(organism)) [25]. This provides consistency to the IC as an assessor of the 
semantics of concepts because, as stated in section 3, generalizations must provide a strict subset of the 
semantics of their specializations. In fact, we recall that the sanitization implemented by our model 
extensively relies on the fact that, by replacing sensitive terms by appropriate generalizations, the amount 
of semantics disclosed is effectively reduced in order to fulfill the privacy model. 
 
Unfortunately, since tagged corpora are commonly annotated manually, their size and coverage are 
limited, especially for domain-specific terms (e.g., technical or scientific terminology), named-entities 
(e.g., organization names) or newly minted terms (e.g., a new electronic device), which are the usual 
targets of document sanitization due to their high specificity/informativeness. Thus, the probability 
 18 
 
calculation may be hampered by data sparseness, which is obviously more prone to appear when 
computing the co-occurrences of several terms in which the PMI calculation relies.  
 
To tackle these limitations, it is possible to use massive raw electronic corpora instead of tagged text. 
Contrary to tagged corpora, electronic raw resources are largely accessible in the Web and cover most 
domains of knowledge. In fact, the corpus of resources offered by the Web is so large and heterogeneous 
that it is said to be a faithful representation of the information distribution at a social scale [36]; this 
argument has been supported by recent works focusing on privacy-protection [14, 37], which considered 
the Web as a realistic proxy for social knowledge. In this respect, the Web provides a good representation 
of the background knowledge K that attackers may exploit to infer sensitive data [37] and, thus, we 
propose to use it for probability calculations; that is, we assume that a perfectly knowledgeable attacker is 
such that has the whole knowledge provided by the Web available. Moreover, within the Web context, 
occurrence and co-occurrence probabilities can be efficiently computed by querying terms in a publicly 
available Web Search Engine (WSE) and retrieving the resulting page count [38]; specifically, the IC of 
an entity and the PMI of a pair can be computed from the Web information distribution as follows: 
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where W is the number of web resources indexed by the web search engine. 
 
Likewise, to evaluate the disclosure that groups of terms T (where T={t1,…,tn} without ordering) cause 
with regard to a sensitive entity c, we can compute their PMI as follows: 
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A limitation of this calculation is the fact that probabilities computed from the WSE page count can be 
severely affected by language ambiguity [30]. When the words used to refer to a concept are polysemic 
(e.g., virus), the probability computed from the web page count will overestimate the actual probability of 
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the underling concept (e.g., (biological) virus), because the count includes all the appearances of the word 
in the Web, regardless of the concept (i.e., meaning) to which they refer to; in this case, the concept will 
be considered less informative than what it truly is. Likewise, if a concept can be referred by means of 
different synonyms (e.g., the terms HIV and human immunodeficiency virus refer to the same disease) or 
entities referred in a discourse are not explicitly included in text due to ellipsis, the resulting probabilities 
will be lower and, thus, the informativeness will be overestimated. Even more important, and also related 
to language ambiguity, the monotonicity of the IC calculation with regard to the taxonomic subsumption 
will be hardly ensured. For example, querying HIV in Google provides 55 million results, whereas 
querying microorganism, which is a generalization of HIV, produces roughly 1.5 millions because many 
appearances of HIV do not explicitly mention microorganism due to ellipsis and synonymy. Taking these 
values independently would result in HIV having much lower informativeness than microorganism, which 
is inconsistent with respect to their taxonomic relationship (HIV is a specialization of microorganism). If 
not solved, this inconsistency will seriously hamper the applicability of our model, in which the 
informativeness of the generalizations (e.g., retrovirus→ virus → microorganism) is used as thresholds to 
configure the allowed disclosure of the semantics of the sensitive entities (e.g., HIV). 
 
To minimize the problems related to language ambiguity and to ensure the monotonicity of the IC 
calculation in which our disclosure assessment relies, in the following we propose a mechanism to 
contextualize WSE queries of sensitive entities within the scope of the generalizations defined in the (C, 
g(C))-sanitization instantiation. The main idea is that, by forcing the co-occurrence of a term referring to 
an entity (e.g., virus, as an infectious microorganism) and the generalization that is adequate to the 
meaning of the entity (e.g., microorganism), the effect of ambiguity in the resulting page count is 
minimized while the monotonicity of the IC calculation between the specialization and the generalization 
is fulfilled. On the one hand, polysemy is minimized because word occurrences rarely refer to different 
senses within the same document: if virus and microorganism co-occur in a document it is very unlikely 
that the former refers to a computer program. Likewise, since only explicit co-occurrences of the term 
and its generalization are considered, the potential ellipses of the latter are omitted from the probability 
assessment, thus fulfilling the monotonicity of the IC calculation (i.e., page_count(“virus” AND 
“microorganism”) < page_count(“microorganism”) and, thus, IC(virus & microorganism) > 
IC(microorganism)). The only drawback is the fact that the explicit contextualization of term occurrences 
will constraint the size of the sample considered in the calculation of probabilities (i.e., all the 
appearances of a (biological) virus alone are omitted). However, the size and redundancy of the Web 
helps to minimize the effect of this handicap, which, in any case, is preferable to the negative influence of 
language ambiguity and the lack of monotonicity [26]. 
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In practice, to contextualize the page count resulting from the queries performed to the WSE, the 
appropriate generalization will be attached to the term to be queried by using a logic operator supported 
by the WSE, such as AND or +. This contextualization is applied to all the queries evaluating the 
disclosure risk of the sensitive entity c, so that the PMI calculation is made numerically coherent with the 
IC of the generalization g(c) that acts as threshold for the (C, g(C))-sanitization instantiation. Indeed, the 
generalization g(c), which is picked up by the user of the model and that would correspond to the 
appropriate meaning of c, will implicitly disambiguate the occurrences of c. In this manner, only the 
occurrences of c that correspond to hyponyms of g(c), which are the appropriate ones to measure the 
disclosure, will be considered in the calculation. Formally, we propose computing the PMI between a 
sensitive entity c and a term t, contextualized by the generalization g(c) defined in (C, g(C))-sanitization, 
which we denote as PMIg(c)(c;t), as follows: 
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( ) log
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We apply this contextualized calculation to the disclosure risk assessment of (C, g(C))-sanitization 
(Definition 3), so that terms t or groups of terms T are risky if PMIg(c)(c;t)>IC(g(c)) or 
PMIg(c)(c;T)>IC(g(c)) for any c in C. Likewise, in case of disclosure and according to eq. (4), we replace t 
by the most informative generalization g(t) that fulfills PMIg(c)(c;g(t))<IC(g(c)) for all c in C. 
 
Probability contextualization ensures the semantic and, thus, numerical consistency of the IC/PMI 
calculus in which the model enforcement relies. As a consequence of this, we also enable that any 
generalization of c could be used as threshold for instantiating (C, g(C))-sanitization, because the 
contextualization fulfills PMIg(c)(c; g(c))=IC(g(c)), which is coherent with the notion of taxonomic 
subsumption; that is, g(c) is completely disclosed by c because the semantics of the former can be 
univocally inferred from the latter. 
5.   Empirical analysis 
In this section, we report and discuss a set of empirical results that show the suitability and benefits of (C, 
g(C))-sanitization and the technical solution presented above (i.e., the heuristic greedy algorithm and the 
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web-based contextualized probabilities) over the basic C-sanitization model, which we use as baseline. 
To evaluate the differences between both approaches (in terms of privacy protection accuracy and 
runtime), we configured the following set of scenarios by enabling or disabling the following features 
proposed in the current work: 
- Model parameterization. As proposed in section 2, the (C, g(C))-sanitization instantiation can be 
tailored to specific privacy/utility needs by using the parameter g(c) (i.e., a generalization g(c) for 
each entity c to be protected) that states the maximum level of disclosure. To analyze the benefits 
of this parameter in the protected outcome, we defined several generalizations for the different 
entities considered in the evaluation and compared the results they obtained against those 
obtained against the (non-parameterized) C-sanitization [13].    
- Analysis of groups of terms. As discussed above, the evaluation of combinations of terms of 
unbounded cardinality can be costly when dealing with large contexts and/or documents, because 
of the number of possible combinations to analyze. In our proposal, the cardinality of the groups 
of terms to be analyzed can be limited by means of the MAX parameter incorporated into 
Algorithm 1 (section 3), which allows reducing the number of elements to analyze. To evaluate 
the influence of this parameter both in the sanitized output and in the run time of the sanitization 
process, we performed different executions by fixing its value to 1 and 2. Due to the tight 
discourses of the evaluated documents (see details below), the whole text has been considered as 
a unique context. 
- Contextualization of probabilities. In section 4, we discussed the issues related to the calculation 
of concept probabilities from the page count of a web search engine, and we proposed a way to 
minimize the effects of language ambiguity while ensuring that probabilities are coherent with the 
notion of taxonomic subsumption. To measure the benefits of this calculation methodology, we 
evaluated the sanitized output resulting from the standard probabilities (as done in [13]) and from 
the contextualized version we propose here. In all cases, we used the Bing 
(http://www.bing.com/) web search engine.  
 
Our experimental case study is based on the privacy requirements stated in U.S. federal laws on medical 
data privacy [24], which mandate hospitals and healthcare organizations to protect medical concepts that 
are considered confidential before releasing patient records to, for example, insurance companies, in 
response to Worker’s Compensation or Motor Vehicle Accident claims, or a judge, in case of malpractice 
litigation [3]. In particular, all references to Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STDs) or HIV status should 
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be redacted or sanitized. To do so, terms explicitly referring to these diseases and those semantically 
related ones such as drugs, treatments or symptoms should be identified and protected [3].    
 
Coherently with the healthcare scope, we used the Wikipedia articles describing the sensitive entities 
(STD and HIV) as the input documents to be protected. Wikipedia articles are commonly used by 
researchers on document sanitization [13, 14, 37, 39-42] because they are considered authoritative sources 
of information and also because of their semantically tight discourses, which configure a specially 
challenging scenario for data protection. 
 
We have instantiated the (C, g(C))-sanitization parameters in accordance with the semantics of the 
entities to be protected and according to the knowledge modeled in a standard knowledge base (WordNet 
[43]), which has been also used as the KB to retrieve the generalizations used to replace (sanitize) risky 
terms. We used Virus and Infection as the generalizations of the two senses of HIV (an infectious agent 
and an infectious disease) and Disease as the generalization of STD. Moreover, we also considered the 
case in which no generalizations are stated, as expressed in Definition 1 [13] .  
 
The evaluation of the sanitized output has been carried out by comparing the former with the sanitization 
performed by a human expert that our proposal tries to mimic. To do so, the expert was requested to 
manually remove terms or groups of terms that, individually or in aggregate, may disclose the entity to be 
protected. Hereinafter, we refer as H to this set of manually removed terms, and as S to the set of terms 
detected by our proposal. The evaluation is performed by comparing the sets H and S according to the 
standard measures of precision, recall and F-measure.  
 
Precision (eq. 4) quantifies the percentage of terms identified as sensitive by our proposal (S), which have 
been removed by the human expert (Η). The higher the precision is, the better the utility of the output will 
be, because we are incurring in a lower number of non-necessary sanitizations. 
 
| | 100
| |
Precision
S H
S
=
∩
×
         
(10)
 
 
Recall (eq. 5) quantifies the percentage of correctly sanitized terms from the total number of terms 
identified by the human expert. The higher the recall is, the better the protection will be.  
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F-measure (eq. 6) quantifies the harmonic mean of precision and recall and, thus, summarizes the 
accuracy of the protection process with respect to the human criterion. 
 
F measure
2× Recall× Precision
Recall + Precision
− =
       
(12) 
5.1.   Results and discussion 
The results obtained for the C-sanitization and (C, g(C))-sanitization, the generalizations of each entity 
(i.e., virus and infection for HIV and disease for STD) and the different implementation parameters 
discussed earlier (i.e., MAX cardinality of groups of 1 or 2 and standard or contextualized probability 
calculations) are evaluated in Tables 1 and 2 for HIV and STD, respectively. 
 
Table 1. Precision, recall and F-measure for different model instantiations (the first row corresponds to C-
sanitization and the second and third to (C, g(C))-sanitization) and implementation parameters for the 
HIV document. 
Model instantiation Implementation parameters Precision Recall F-measure 
HIV-sanitization 
 
MAX=1; Standard probability 100% 23.8% 38.4% 
MAX=1; Contextualized probability N/A N/A N/A 
MAX=2; Standard probability 
MAX=2; Contextualized probability 
65.5% 
N/A 
90,5% 
N/A 
76% 
N/A 
(HIV, Virus)-sanitization 
 
MAX=1; Standard probability 88.9% 38.1% 53.3% 
MAX=1; Contextualized probability 84.2% 76.2% 80% 
MAX=2; Standard probability 
MAX=2; Contextualized probability 
61.3% 
67.7% 
100% 
100% 
76% 
80.7% 
(HIV, Infection)-
sanitization  
 
MAX=1; Standard probability 100% 33.3% 50% 
MAX=1; Contextualized probability 74% 95.2% 83.3% 
MAX=2; Standard probability 
MAX=2; Contextualized probability 
53.8% 
58.3% 
100% 
100% 
70% 
73.7% 
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Table 2. Precision, recall and F-measure for different model instantiations (the first row corresponds to C-
sanitization and the second to (C, g(C))-sanitization) and implementation parameters for the STD 
document. 
Model instantiation Implementation parameters Precision Recall F-measure 
STD-sanitization 
 
MAX=1; Standard probability 87.5% 18.9% 31.1% 
MAX=1; Contextualized probability N/A N/A N/A 
MAX=2; Standard probability 
MAX=2; Contextualized probability 
64.1% 
N/A 
67.6% 
N/A 
65.8% 
N/A 
(STD, Disease)-sanitization 
 
MAX=1; Standard probability 73.3% 29.7% 42.3% 
MAX=1; Contextualized probability 73.3% 59.4% 65.6% 
MAX=2; Standard probability 
MAX=2; Contextualized probability 
62.1% 
61.2% 
97.3% 
100% 
75.8% 
75.9% 
 
Several conclusions arise from the analysis of these results. The best results from the privacy protection 
perspective (i.e., recall) are achieved when groups of terms are considered in the analysis (i.e., MAX=2), 
which produces nearly perfect results in all cases. Obviously, this implies evaluating a larger number of 
term combinations, which also requires a significantly larger number of queries to a WSE and, hence, 
increases the time needed to sanitize the document. The run time aspect will be discussed latter in this 
section. However, it is important to note that a cardinality of 2 seems to be enough to detect almost all the 
risky terms and that further analyses of larger combinations are not really necessary. On the other hand, 
this setting suffers from a lower precision, which may hamper the utility of the output due to the larger 
number of unnecessarily sanitized terms. The low precision is caused, in general, because probability 
calculations suffer from data sparseness when dealing with queries with a large number of terms [26].  
 
On the other hand, the effect of the contextualized probability calculation for groups of terms over the 
precision is less noticeable in comparison with the analysis of individual terms. Indeed, the fact that we 
are evaluating groups of terms and, thus, querying them together to the web search engine already 
minimizes term ambiguity. Moreover, precision slightly decreases as the generalizations used as 
thresholds in the model instantiation become less specific because i) most of the sensitive terms appearing 
in the document have been already detected and ii) the stricter analysis tends to increase the number of 
false positives. 
 
In contrast, if we limit the analysis to individual terms (i.e., MAX=1), recall lowers significantly because 
combinations of individually innocuous terms (which are risky in aggregate) remain unprotected. In fact, 
for C-sanitization, for which no generalizations are used as thresholds (i.e., HIV-sanitization and STD-
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sanitization), and with the standard probability calculation, which is hampered by language ambiguity, 
(see row 1 of tables 1 and 2) the recall is so low that the output will hardly avoid disclosure (i.e., 23.8% 
for HIV and 18.9% for STD). In this case, (C, g(C))-sanitization helps to make the sanitization process 
stricter, thus increasing the recall. The same can be said when generalizations are used to contextualize 
the probability calculation proposed in section 4 because, since we are considering individual terms 
(which can be potentially ambiguous), the inclusion of the generalizations in the queries helps to make the 
probabilities more precise, while ensuring the numerical consistency with respect to the taxonomic 
subsumption. As a result, recall significantly increases as generalizations become less specific (i.e., 76.2% 
for (HIV, Virus)-sanitization, 95.2% for (HIV, Infection)-sanitization and 59.4% for (STD, Disease)-
sanitization). Note also that contextualized term probabilities can only be applied to the (C, g(C))-
sanitization model, since we need the generalization defined as sanitization threshold to contextualize the 
queries. 
 
The results of the analysis suggest that the best configuration from the privacy protection perspective is 
such in which groups of terms with cardinality around 2 are considered (i.e., highest recall). However, a 
better balance between utility and protection can be achieved in the case of analyzing individual terms but 
using an adequate generalization as threshold and contextualizing term probabilities. In any case, an 
additional dimension should be considered in order to prefer one approach or the other: the run time of the 
sanitization process. In Table 3 we provide the average evaluation results (i.e., precision, recall and F-
measure) of the different model instantiations and documents (i.e., HIV and STD) showed in the previous 
tests (entities and model instantiations) together with the average run time required to sanitize the 
documents for each parameter value.  
   
Table 3. Average precision, recall, F-measure and run time for the different implementation parameters. 
Implementation parameters Avg. Precision Avg. Recall Avg. F-measure Avg. time 
MAX=1; Standard probability 89.9% 28,8% 43% 1 min. 
MAX=1; Contextualized probability 77.2% 76.9% 76.3% 2 min. 
MAX=2; Standard probability 61.4% 91.1% 72.7% 40 min. 
MAX=2; Contextualized probability 62.4% 100% 76.8% 41 min. 
 
Run time differences are very noticeable when moving from the analysis of individual terms to 
combinations of just two terms. Indeed, in the former scenario, the computational cost scales linearly with 
respect to the number of terms in the document, whereas in the latter the cost is exponential with respect 
to the number of terms and the cardinality of the groups. Even though the actual cost of evaluating groups 
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of terms is minimized in practice thanks to the heuristics implemented in the proposed Algorithm 1, the 
analysis of term combinations incurs in a high cost because of the large number of queries that are 
required. This may be problematic for large documents or contexts. In such cases, the highly scalable 
analysis of individual terms may be preferable, especially under the consideration that the sanitization can 
be made stricter (i.e., to increase the recall) by using less specific generalizations as thresholds (e.g., the 
output of (HIV, infection)-sanitization achieves a recall of 95,2% in around 2 minutes).   
 
On the other hand, the average evaluation measures shown in Table 3 suggest that the contextualization of 
probabilities we propose in section 5 adds no significant execution overhead over the analysis (since the 
number of queries remains the same, but just involving more terms), and also helps to improve the results 
in all cases. It is important to note that the increase in run time resulting from the contextualization of 
individual terms (1 vs. 2 minutes, in average) can be explained by the larger number of sanitizations 
resulting from the more precise analysis, which requires additional queries to assess and select the 
generalization to be used as replacement of risky terms. 
6.   Conclusions and future work 
The main goal of our work is to offer a theoretically sound and practically feasible solution to assist the 
burdensome task of manual document sanitization and to do so by mimicking the semantic reasoning 
employed by human sanitizers. To advance in that direction, in this paper we presented the theory and 
developed the practical aspects of (C, g(C))-sanitization, a flexible and inherently semantic privacy model 
for plain textual documents that, in comparison with other works focusing on documents sanitization [15, 
22, 23], offers an intuitive instantiation and clear beforehand privacy guarantees to practitioners.  
 
The main contributions of our work are: i) we proposed a flexible model that allows to intuitively 
configure the trade-off between the desired level of protection and of utility preservation; ii) we designed 
a customizable and scalable algorithm implementing the model that is driven by several semantics-
preserving heuristics; iii) we detailed a general solution to coherently and accurately compute the term 
probabilities needed by the information theoretic enforcement of the model by using the Web and web 
search engines as proxies for social knowledge. As a result, we provided the tools to ensure the 
applicability and accuracy of (C, g(C))-sanitization in practical scenarios, putting special emphasis on the 
preservation of data utility and in ensuring the scalability of the implementation. Empirical results and 
comparisons against the baseline showed that such tools contributed to improve the accuracy of the actual 
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protection and also provided the flexibility to tune the behavior of the implementation according to 
specific needs (privacy, privacy/utility ratio and/or scalability). 
 
As future work, in order to further illustrate the convenience and benefits of our model, we plan to 
engineer a set of case studies that show: i) how (C, g(C))-sanitization can be instantiated in accordance 
with the legislations on data privacy that are available for different areas (healthcare, finances, census, 
etc.) and, ii) how it can be applied to a variety of textual inputs (e.g., unstructured medical records, 
messages to be published in social media, e-mails, documents to be declassified, etc.). Moreover, we also 
plan to extend the implementation to support a variety of knowledge bases (i.e., other domain specific 
KBs such as SNOMED-CT or MeSH for medical data) and languages (by relying on multi-language 
linguistic tools to extract terms, such as OpenNLP and NLTK, and the translations available for the KBs 
to retrieve suitable generalizations). 
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